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ABSTRACT The Prevent policy was introduced in the UK in 2003 as part of an overall post
9/11 counter-terrorism approach (CONTEST), with the aim of preventing the radicalisation of
individuals to terrorism. In 2015, the Prevent policy became a legal duty for public sector
institutions, and as such, its reach has extended much deeper into society. This article, based
on ongoing ethnographic ﬁeldwork—including interviews, focus groups and participant
observations—seeks to uncover and analyse the function of surveillance at the heart of the
Prevent strategy. Contrary to ofﬁcial denials, surveillance forms an essential feature of the
Prevent strategy. It regards radicalisation as part of an overall conveyor belt to terrorism, and
thus attempts to control the future by acting in the present. The article shows how the
framing of the terror threat in the ‘war on terror’, as an ‘Islamic threat’, has afforded a
surveillance infrastructure, embedded into Muslim communities, which has securitised
relations with local authorities. Its intelligence products, as well as the affective consequences
of surveillance, have served to contain and direct Muslim political agency. Such an analysis
uncovers the practice of Islamophobia at the heart of the Prevent strategy, which accounts for
its surveillance tendencies.
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Introduction
The Prevent strategy is one strand of the UK counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. It was introduced in 2003by the New Labour government of Tony Blair. Initially,
Prevent played a minor role in CONTEST relative to the other
strands. But following the attacks in London on 7th July 2005, the
importance of the Prevent strategy increased as the government
sought to deal with a risk of ‘home-grown’ terrorism. At its core,
the Prevent strategy was built to be the ‘hearts and minds’
dimension of the overall CONTEST strategy. It aims to prevent
radicalisation to terrorism and has three strategic objectives to
that end: (1) respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism; (2)
prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that
they are given appropriate advice and support; and (3) work with
sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation
(HM Government, 2011a). In 2015, the Prevent strategy was
placed on a legal footing in the Counter-Terrorism and Security
Act, so that speciﬁed authorities such as Higher Education
Institutions, need to have ‘due regard to the need to prevent
people from being drawn into terrorism’ (HM Government, 2015,
p 2). Since then, speciﬁed authorities have been creating and
implementing policies and procedures that demonstrate com-
pliance with this new Prevent Duty (see Qurashi, 2017). A
partnership approach with Muslim communities has been at the
heart of delivering these Prevent objectives.
Using data from ongoing ethnographic ﬁeldwork – including
interviews, focus groups, and participant observations – the
article argues that this dynamic of the Prevent strategy has been
used to develop infrastructures of embedded surveillance in
Muslim communities. Using Sayyid’s (2010, 1997) formulation of
Islamophobia, as a racist practice that contains Muslim political
agency, the article argues that the intelligence products of the
embedded infrastructures of surveillance, as well as the affective
consequences of Prevent surveillance, have served to contain and
direct Muslim political agency and activism.
Islamophobia and the ‘war on terror’
The ‘war on terror’ has come to deﬁne this era for Muslims in
Britain. It touches every aspect of life, from birth to death, in
every space that Muslims inhabit: the home; schools, colleges, and
universities; mosques; community centres; and public spaces.
Whether it be Schedule 7 stops at UK ports,1stop and search by
police ofﬁcers, Prevent referrals to the Channel pro-
gramme,2experiences of institutionalised Islamophobia, or violent
racist attacks, the overt focus on Muslims and Islam in the ‘war
on terror’ has energised Islamophobia and enhanced the pre-
cariousness of the Muslim experience in Britain. To uncover the
political dimensions of Islamophobia in UK counter-terrorism
(speciﬁcally the Prevent strategy), I move beyond simple char-
acterisations of Islamophobia that focus on irrational bigoted
individuals on the extremes of the political spectrum, by using
Sayyid’s (2010, 1997) formulation of Islamophobia: a racist
practice that aims to stiﬂe and contain Muslim political agency.
This extends an analysis of Islamophobia from the fringes of
society to the mainstream, from a practice that is the preserve of
extremist individuals and groups, to one that is deeply embedded
in society – legally, culturally, and psychologically. By using this
approach, the aim is to analyse Islamophobia at an institutional
level, as a conscious strategy and practice of power, as it is
embedded into policies and practices that routinely privilege
white interests and contain the interests of ethnic minority
groups. This approach unpicks the Islamophobia which is ende-
mic and ingrained and which appears as a normal, harmless,
mundane feature of society, infused into a wide range of policies
and practices, which, regardless of intent, reinforce and reproduce
racism (Gillborn, 2008). In short, it seeks to disrupt the nor-
malised forms of Islamophobia as well as the more exceptional
forms. The end goal is to demonstrate how the racist outcomes of
social policies, such as counter-terrorism policies, are far from
accidental, but rather are a reﬂection of the racist politics and
practices of power that underpin them (Gillborn, 2008). In the
context of the Prevent strategy, this framework offers a way of
making sense of its disproportionate impact on Muslim
communities.
The universalising essence of Islamophobia, which casts all
Muslims and Islam as uncivilised, barbaric and threatening, is
culturally rooted in the west and operationalises Islamophobia
through beliefs, ideas, tropes and analyses about Muslims and
Islam on which the containment and disciplining of Muslims and
Islam is situated and justiﬁed (Fawzi, 2015; Said, 2003). Muslim
political agency refers to an engagement with politics that is based
on an Islamic discourse, symbolism and practice (Birt, 2010).
Islamophobia encapsulates a fear and disdain of this agency in the
public space and aims to suppress Islamic politics, identities, and
bodies through institutional structures, and contain Muslims
within national borders (by articulating national Muslim iden-
tities) to stem a broader mobilisation of Muslims across the
world. Contemporary manifestations of Islamophobia emerged
during the latter part of the twentieth century, at which point
Islamic revivalism was underpinning the political mobilisation of
Muslims and an assertion of Muslim identity across Europe
(equality and human rights), and the world (anti-colonial strug-
gles). Islamophobia emerged at this point in history to discipline
Muslims and reinforce a hierarchy between the west and Islam,
and between Europeanness and non-Europeanness, which was
being challenged by Muslims that were making politically sig-
niﬁcant claims, and presenting different political possibilities
(Sayyid, 2010). In short, Islamophobia emerged at a time when
traditional hierarchies were breaking down, and it served to
remind Muslims of their inferior status and contain any political
mobilisation and claims making (hence the prevalence of Isla-
mophobia across all sectors of society, from housing to education,
reminding and disciplining Muslims at every turn).
Framed in this way, an understanding of Islamophobia goes
beyond simple negative characterisations of Muslims and Islam
and taps into and reﬂects a historical management of Muslims
(and broader black and ethnic minority groups) that accounts for
historical inequities. Furthermore, as Sian (2015) argues, such a
view of Islamophobia shifts the focus away from individual
incidents towards the structural operations of power that govern
Muslims and the conditions within which violent and non-violent
incidents occur. In this paper, I argue that Islamophobia (enabled
by practices of surveillance), rather than any counter-terror logic,
operates as the central organising logic of the ‘war on terror’.
Islamophobia and the historical containment of ‘Others’
The strategies of containing and managing Muslim agency
emerge from the European colonial era management of ‘Others’:
from physical containment strategies such as the use of Pass-
books, slave passes, and the use of disproportionate levels of
violence to contain agitation by slaves (Parenti, 2003); to the more
traditional use of informants, and police forces, to monitor
groups and individuals with the aim of identifying those resisting
colonialism as it sought to militarily invade, occupy, conquer, and
socially engineer indigenous populations with reference to wes-
tern capitalist ideals (Monaghan, 2013); to reinforcing colonial
racial hierarchies by enforcing racial segregation to minimise
mixing and marriage (Sa’di, 2012); to the more recent practice
during the era of slavery and Jim Crow in America of (violently)
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suppressing the black gaze in the presence of whites to enforce an
inferior status and contain claims and agitations for equality
(hooks, 1992; Browne, 2012). Since then, as ethnic minorities
have slowly entered institutional spaces Collins (1998) argues a
new politics of containment has emerged, in which surveillance
strategies are used to ensure ethnic minorities are unraced so as
not to challenge the whiteness of institutional spaces (Mirza,
2006).
As surveillance has been embedded into the fabric of society,
the management and containment of populations has reached
new heights of sophistication. Surveillance practices and cap-
abilities provide the state enhanced forms of visibility to effect
containment strategies that ensure its dominance (Fiske, 1998).
For instance, cities are more precisely zoned in ways that ensure
ethnic and religious minorities are contained within particular
geographic spaces, and marked as being out of place when they
transgress the boundaries (Hesse, 1997). Futhermore, with the
intensiﬁcation of globalisation, European states have moved
towards the direct management of religious minorities by
adopting repressive strategies of containment. Some of these
strategies include the creation of enclaves to quarantine religious
minorities away from mainstream society, which results in the
deprivation of mobility and universal rights afforded to citizens
(Turner, 2007). Surveillance technologies are increasingly impli-
cated in these strategies as they are used to create technological
rings of steel. Project Champion in Birmingham, in which covert
and overt Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) cameras
were placed in predominantly Muslim parts of the city, was an
instance of this trend. (Lewis, 2010).
In an era of globalisation characterised by mobility, these
strategies of containment operating at a national level, have been
extended to operate across the world to manage and contain
global mobilities. Shamir (2005) identiﬁes the emergence of a
global mobility regime underpinned by a paradigm of suspicion
that operates to treat people differently: to enable the movement
of those considered ‘safe’ while containing and blocking the
movement of those constructed as ‘dangerous’. Surveillance
practices play a key role in the global management and con-
tainment of populations and have led to the emergence of a global
Banopticon (Bigo, 2008), which is in part aimed at containing
foreigners on the margins. It is made up of a heterogeneous set of
discourses, institutions, architectural structures, laws and
administrative measures. As it is concerned with the management
of unease, the Banopticon unearths a different set of motives, to
countering terrorism, that sit behind surveillance practices:
‘keeping the poorest foreigners at a distance, through controlling
the ﬂux of mobile populations’ (Bigo, 2008: p. 18). This logic
means that the surveillance of those characterised as ‘suspect’ and
‘dangerous’, as opposed to the universal surveillance of wider
society, sits at the heart of policing.
Containment, surveillance and soul training
The attempts to contain a particular population and its political
agency using surveillance technologies, is a prelude to a broader
strategy of social engineering and discipline aimed at inclusion
into a western capitalist order. Using surveillance to manage
and contain a population provides the necessary detailed
knowledge to ‘see’ it and break it down into governable units
(Haggerty, 2006). The surveillance gaze allows for a population
to be known which is a prerequisite for it to become a site of
action: identifying the ‘risks’ that need to be neutralised; the
unacceptable, abnormal behaviours and ideas that need to be
disciplined by way of extending social norms to mould ideas
and behaviours (Fiske, 1998). In the panopticon model, Fou-
cault identiﬁed this as a process of ‘soul training’ that was
aimed at the automatic functioning of power: to transform
individuals so that they monitored their own behaviour in line
with prescribed social norms, to the extent that there was a
realignment of the boundaries between the ‘acceptable’ and
‘unacceptable’, and the ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ (Lyon, 1994;
Foucault, 1991).
The power of surveillance to demonise people, conduct, and
ideas is not always informed by the criminal justice imperative of
the rule of law, where only those engaged in obviously criminal
conduct are targeted by surveillance practices for ‘soul training’
and inclusion. Historically, surveillance was at the heart of
colonial projects, monitoring the adoption and resistance to
imposed European ideals and practices, and monitoring traces of
indigeneity that threatened colonial projects. Those that adopted
European ideals and conduct were labelled ‘good’ and marked for
inclusion, while those that opposed them were considered ‘bad’,
excluded, and marked for intervention. Therefore, surveillance
has been at the heart of the demonisation of expressions of
indigeneity, and the promotion of ‘Europeanness’ as ‘good’ and
aspirational, as it enabled the capitalist colonial project of
expansionism (Monaghan, 2013).
To be included is to be integrated into the norms, behaviours,
values, ideas, consciousness, emotions and cognitions of society
(in place of one’s own outlook) that can reproduce western modes
of life (Sa’di, 2012). In the ‘war on terror’, a key component of de-
radicalisation programmes hinges on a cultural transformation of
Muslim identity to view the west and all it stands for (its ways of
life, values, and politics) with a more positive attitude. Pro-
western or ‘moderate’ Muslims are rewarded by being valued as
‘true’ Muslims, their interpretations and religious traditions are
elevated as true reﬂections of Islam, and they are often referred to
as representatives of the Muslim community. If strategies of
inclusion fail, then the individual is purposefully excluded from
mainstream society and marked as a threat, for intervention, as
the ﬁnal option. Exclusion is aimed at protecting mainstream
society by preventing the excluded subjects from reaching,
communicating, and working with mainstream society. It enables
and legitimises the use of violence, coercion, and intense sur-
veillance, all of which can violate basic human rights (Kundnani,
2014).
The Prevent strategy and the containment of Muslims and
Islam
In the UK dimension of the global ‘war on terror’, the Prevent
strategy (HM Government, 2011a) occupies a central role, and is
a continuation of historical strategies of containment aimed at
‘Others’. Although it was introduced with the seemingly positive
goal of preventing radicalisation to terrorism in the UK, and
political leaders claim (out of necessity) that it targets all threats
of terrorism and extremism, what is clear, is that counter-
terrorism practice (particularly in the Prevent strategy) targets
Muslims in general, and in many cases where there is no suspi-
cion or evidence of criminal activity (Cohen and Tufail, 2017;
Versi, 2017). It is therefore difﬁcult to sustain an argument about
the operation of (Prevent) counter-terrorism as a response to a
terror threat.
Instead, the Prevent strategy has been at the forefront of dis-
seminating and normalising Islamophobia across society, by
inscribing its assumptions and prejudices into the structural
operation of numerous institutions, and shaping the practices of
public sector employees. In the strategy, the problem of extre-
mism and terrorism is closely tied to Muslims and Islam, so that
the terror threat is regarded as an Islamic threat. Others, such as
Davies (2016), have argued that although the policy document
does refer to other groups and forms of terrorism (such as right
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wing terrorism), the thrust of the policy is about Islamic terror-
ism. Furthermore, its emphasis on teaching ‘British values’ sug-
gests its focus is on those who do not authentically (know how to)
practice Britishness. Framing the threat in this way not only
‘others’ Muslims, but the ‘otherness’ narrows the public percep-
tion of Muslims down to terrorist violence and inscribes the
characteristics onto the public consciousness, further normalising
Islamophobia. The normalisation augments the state’s ability to
use enhanced forms of social control, exclusion, and violence
against Muslim communities.
The overarching framework that associates Muslims and Islam
with terrorism is mirrored in policy discourse in which there are
regular associations between Muslims and Islam and extremist
and terrorist activity. For instance, a 2007 document produced by
the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG,
2007: p. 7) offered guidance to evaluate the effective use of Pre-
vent counter-terrorism funding in the following way: ‘The key
measure of success will be demonstrable changes in attitudes
among Muslims, and wider communities they are part of, locally
and nationally’. The guidance refers to Muslims in general and
‘wider communities’ as opposed to individuals and groups sus-
pected of criminal activity. This kind of policy discourse often
works its way into political and media rhetoric as its normalising
power imbues politicians and media outlets with a ‘retaliatory
conﬁdence’ (Gillborn, 2008), in the name of security, to enhance
social control and state power. Blanket approaches to counter-
terrorism such as this play on orientalist cultural narratives of an
ever present Islamic threat to the west. Indeed, the cultural
‘threat’ of Islam, characterised as ‘non-violent extremism’ in the
Prevent strategy, has come to dominate the construction of Islam
in the public imagination such that it has become common place
to view Muslims and Islam through this lens (exempliﬁed in the
Trojan Horse affair, see Miah, 2017). The underlying notion here
of a threat emerging from Islam to the west has long existed and
over the past few decades has primarily been articulated through
Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis (Huntington,
1996), which suggests a threat from a clashing of civilizational
values: the threat to enlightened western ideals and values from a
fundamentalist and illiberal Islamic world. In recent times a lib-
eral variation of this narrative has emerged that points not to
Islam itself, but to ‘warped interpretations’ of Islam by extremists
as the source of threat to the west (Kundnani, 2014). Orientalist
narratives of this kind function to reinforce the perception that
‘Islamic terrorism’ somehow emerges from, or is indeed rooted in,
Islamic doctrine and practice, rather than the social and political
realities of the world, and in turn, situates Islam itself as the
source of the threat.
Framing the terror threat in this way (as an Islamic threat)
means that the infrastructure and focus of counter-terrorism
practices, such as surveillance, are overwhelmingly directed at
Muslims. For instance, when Prevent counter-terrorism funding
was distributed by central government to local authorities, it was
done so in direct proportion to the number of Muslims in a local
authority area (Kundnani, 2009; DCLG, 2007). More recently,
Cobain et al., (2016) and Hayes and Qureshi (2016) have shown
how the counter-terror work of the Research and Information
Communications Unit (RICU) at the Home Ofﬁce focuses on
Muslims as its target audience, and its counter-terrorism research
focuses on Muslims and Islam. For example, between 2007–2010,
RICU research projects investigated the following issues: ‘How
young British Muslims felt about their identity and sense of
belonging’; ‘How young British Muslims use the internet’; ‘How
government messages are perceived by Muslim communities’;
‘Islamic blogs’; ‘The language of terrorism’; and ‘Why some voices
are more credible than others to Muslim communities’. It is,
therefore, not surprising that given the discursive characterisation
of the terror threat as an Islamic threat, and the Muslim-centric
nature of counter-terror practice, that Muslims make up an
overwhelming proportion of referrals to the Channel programme.
For instance, data published following two freedom of informa-
tion requests shows that: between April 2007 and December 2010,
67% of Prevent referrals involved Muslims, between April 2012
and January 2014 that ﬁgure was 57.4% (Traquair, 2014); and
between April 2012 and April 2015 at least 69% of the referrals
involved Muslims, and between April 2015 and April 2016 at least
68% of the referrals involved Muslims (Traquair, 2016). This is
despite the fact that, according to the last census in 2011, Muslims
make up 4.8% of the population of England and Wales (Ali,
2015).
Surveillance and the Prevent strategy in the ‘war on terror’
Surveillance is at the heart of containment mechanisms in the
Prevent strategy and it has fundamentally reshaped relations
between Muslims, the state, and wider society. The strategy’s
focus on prevention leads it to conceive of radicalisation as a
process driven by an ideology. Prevent awareness training (such
as the Home Ofﬁce Workshop to Raise Awareness about Prevent)
theorises that a terrorist attack is the end point of a process, or the
tip of an iceberg. In order to monitor the process, and identify
individuals on the path to radicalisation, the job of Prevent work
is to encourage vigilance and to look for signs,3such as beha-
vioural changes, that would indicate a person is on a conveyor
belt of radicalisation to terrorism. Since the vast majority of the
iceberg is not easily visible it has to be made visible by strategies
of surveillance and monitoring, to allow interventions in the
process (HM Government, 2011a). This view of radicalisation
and terrorism moves Prevent counter-terrorism into the pre-
crime domain of pre-emption, which is built upon strategies of
surveillance (Qurashi, 2017). In order to predict and pre-empt an
action, there needs to be some level of intelligence to inform
decision making. As such, surveillance in the Prevent strategy is
not an aberration, or the product of poor practice, but an inbuilt
feature of a strategy that is oriented to acting on the future. As
part of similar counter-terrorism strategies in the United States of
America, investigative journalism has uncovered widespread
organised surveillance of speciﬁcally Muslim communities, busi-
nesses and organisations under the guise of community engage-
ment (Aaronson, 2013; CBS/AP, 2012).
There are some indications that intelligence gathering has been
at the heart of Prevent practice. For example, in 2009 Ed Hussain
of the Quilliam Foundation (which received £700,000 for Prevent
related work in that year) said of Prevent, ‘It is gathering intel-
ligence on people not committing terrorist offences’ (Dodd,
2009). More recently, following the terrorist attack on Manchester
in 2017, Home Secretary Amber Rudd countered claims on an
episode of Question Time, that cuts to police funding may have
impeded the prevention of the terror attack. Instead she said, ‘We
get the intelligence much more from the Prevent strategy, which
engages with local community groups, not through the police’
(The Guardian, 2017).
Despite this, there have been longstanding denials from the
Home Ofﬁce about allegations of spying as part of the Prevent
strategy. For example, the 2011 Prevent Review stated ‘Prevent
project funding was not conditional on the disclosure of sensitive
personal information…there was no evidence that data was being
collected as a matter of course on a wide range of personal
issues…the report accepted that the allegations about data shar-
ing were based on a misunderstanding about the process for
supporting vulnerable people’ (HM Government, 2011a: p. 31).
Rather, the review claimed that information was only collected for
community mapping and project monitoring.
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Democratising counter-terrorism: inviting Muslims into
institutional spaces and laying the foundations for Prevent
surveillance
However, several Muslim organisations across the country funded
by the Prevent strategy, claimed that police and Prevent ofﬁcers
regularly requested, by pestering and pressuring, for speciﬁc
detailed information about the young Muslims using their ser-
vices. Using ethnographic data, the next part of the article
demonstrates how infrastructures of surveillance have been cre-
ated in Muslim communities using the Prevent strategy.
The policing and surveillance of Muslim communities in the
‘war on terror’ occurs on multiple levels. The more overt and
apparent strategies involve CCTV surveillance (at times in a
targeted fashion, such as Project Champion in Birmingham), and
higher levels of policing. Across all of the research sites, the high
level of policing of Muslim communities was a constant theme of
daily ﬁeld notes. The noise of police sirens, overhead helicopters,
the ﬂashing of police lights, police and police community support
ofﬁcers patrolling the streets in large numbers, police in cars,
CCTV vans, riot vans, police on bikes, on horseback, and in
unmarked cars made it clear during ﬁeldwork that these com-
munities were being heavily policed. At peak times outside
mosques (Friday prayers and during Ramadan) there was always
a police presence (police ofﬁcers either standing outside or
driving by in CCTV vans); Fig. 1).
But since the introduction of the Prevent strategy a new layer
of surveillance in Muslim communities has been built, enabled by
a policy agenda of direct community engagement operationalised
by the institutionalisation of relations between local authorities
and local communities. Direct community engagement, in the
form of building networks, fortifying relations and inviting local
voluntary organisations into institutionalised spaces, was a policy
agenda most strongly adopted and championed by the New
Labour government in 1997. New Labour wanted to move beyond
the conﬁnes of the market and the state and adopt a ‘third way’
approach, characterised by partnerships and community
engagement via funded forums, councils and panels, to issues
such as welfare, social exclusion and the modernisation of local
government, which would provide a space and voice for local
voluntary organisations in the policy making process (Farrelly
and Sullivan, 2010; Taylor, 2007; Taylor et al., 2004). The ratio-
nale for this direct form of community engagement was to
address a democratic deﬁcit by encouraging politicians and policy
makers to listen and respond to the needs of the people, parti-
cularly those excluded from decision making such as ethnic
minorities, and by doing so, improve public service delivery
(Cornwall, 2004). Moving away from the Conservative Party’s
individualised concept of the citizen, in these developments New
Labour aimed to responsibilise citizens to create their own welfare
(Barnes et al., 2004). These new spaces are characterised as
‘invited spaces’ to symbolise the power relations in the spaces,
which can be opened and closed by the local authority (Cornwall,
2004).
Rather than heralding neighbourhood renewal, these new
governance spaces mask new forms of state control given the
power imbalances, ongoing attempts of re-centralisation, and
practices of co-option. As ‘invited spaces’, they are inscribed with
the rationalities of the state and the economy, which exercise
signiﬁcant inﬂuence in directing the rules and agendas to the
detriment of local communal priorities and goals, so that com-
munity participants feel they have a small voice, little power and
limited impact. In this context, in an attempt to acquire greater
power, voice and impact, some community actors internalise the
rationalities and objectives of the state and economy to demon-
strate their capabilities for governing in ways that suit the
dominant powerful state actors (Farrelly and Sullivan, 2010;
Taylor, 2007).
Direct community engagement with Muslim communities to
deliver the objectives of the Prevent strategy was built upon an
institutionalisation of relations between local authority
Fig. 1 Police ofﬁcer outside a mosque after Juma (Friday prayer). This ﬁgure is covered by the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
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organisations (such as the police, Prevent ofﬁcers and local
authority ofﬁcers) and Muslim civil society organisations (such as
mosques, community centres and youth clubs that received
Prevent funding). A pretext of project management and support
allowed local authority ﬁgures to meet regularly (at least once per
week, often more regularly depending on the number of sessions
per week) with the Prevent funded organisations and build
informal and formal (institutionalised) relations. However, local
authorities have used these opportunities and pretexts to saturate
large parts of Muslim communities and build infrastructures of
surveillance.
The institutionalisation of relations with Muslim commu-
nities to deliver the Prevent strategy needs to be situated in this
context, in which local authorities attempted to gain a level of
buy-in from Muslim communities and responsibilise them to
take a role in counter-terrorism in their own communities.
Muslim actors internalising the objectives of the Prevent
strategy and implementing them in their own communities, was
a more effective method of achieving the counter-terrorism
objectives, than using a more hierarchical approach involving
external actors from police forces and local authorities. This
approach was particularly important for the Prevent strategy
given that, I would argue, a rationale of surveillance under-
pinned Muslim community engagement. This form of
engagement lends itself to mapping and documenting Muslim
communities, because as research on covert policing shows
(O’Neill and Loftus, 2013), partnerships are conducive to the
development of trust because they place various actors in close
proximity for prolonged periods of time, and to the routine
unquestioned nature of collection and sharing of increasingly
sensitive intelligence.
Institutionalised relations between Muslim civil society orga-
nisations and various local authority organisations (whether it is
the local police, counter-terrorism unit (CTU) or Prevent ofﬁcers)
have been cultivated in various ways. For Muslim organisations,
access to new sources of funding was a major factor that informed
their decision to engage with local authorities on the Prevent
agenda. The funding from the Prevent stream provided a much
needed income, and engaging with the Prevent agenda also raised
the proﬁle of an organisation. For local authorities, however,
engagement with particular Muslim organisations was in part
determined by the size and reach of their network into the local
Muslim community.
As local authorities received Prevent funding from central
government, local Prevent ofﬁcers consulted with Muslim civil
society organisations to raise awareness about the availability of
new Prevent funding, about the kinds of projects that they should
create (such as youth leadership programmes), and encouraged
them to submit applications. Those organisations that were
interested in applying for the Prevent funds were supported by
Prevent ofﬁcers through the application process, and applications
were assessed at commissioning panels.
The process of institutionalisation. One Muslim youth organi-
sation in Birmingham, formed and led by Aleesha and some core
members, to provide educational support for local young people,
decided to apply for Prevent funding:
‘So how did the idea of this organisation start?’
‘Me and another girl, we used to just meet and talk about
issues in our community and how there are a lot of issues in
our community that need addressing, and how no one is
doing anything about them. So we said, “let’s do something
about this instead of complaining”. So, we set up this
organisation which Alhamdulillah is doing really well. So,
for the ﬁrst year, we just did workshops and circles with the
girls, you know, and we invited speakers to give talks.’
‘How long have you been going?’
‘We’ve been going three years. The ﬁrst year was just
informal when we met for halaqah’s [circles] and did
workshops occasionally. We want to be able to offer our
youth role models so they don’t feel lost and they can take
some inspiration to do well.’
‘How did you decide that you needed Prevent funding for
this project?’
‘There’s only so much you can do on a voluntary basis. For
example, we have our workshops. But we need a venue for
that. Initially we relied on donations from parents but
there’s only so much parents can donate. The other thing
was, we needed more dedicated staff, because we were all
volunteers, and someone who could work dedicated
constantly. We needed more dedicated staff because the
numbers grew and so we needed more staff. The current
situation wasn’t sustainable because we got married, had
kids, and had more responsibilities as well.’
‘So basically you grew to a point where you could no
longer remain as a voluntary organisation?’
‘Yeah that’s right. We have too many kids on our list; even
at the halaqah’s we have lots of people. We didn’t know
where to do go for funding so we asked around a few people
in key places, how they applied, and got advice on applying
for funding. We spoke to people in the council who worked
on PREVENT and in our area and on the same issues. We
tried to apply for funding but we needed better advice. So
then the head of PREVENT in Birmingham approached us
and he’s a policeman. A year before he approached us, he
did get in touch and asked if he could work with us.’
‘Why did he get in touch with you?’
We needed money and he knew one of the council workers
we approached and he found out that we were applying for
funding. And he thought it would be good to have a link
with the police. So I wrote this funding application and it
was crap. If that was me giving the funding I wouldn’t have
funded that application. But the PREVENT people said
“yeah yeah have the money”. We were like “Alhamdulillah,
thank you.”
‘How much did they give you if you don’t mind me
asking?’
‘It was just about £50,000 staggered quarterly for 1 year. We
never asked for that much initially. Originally we applied
for £30,000 but then we had to up it because we couldn’t
stretch that to what we needed it for. So we had to go back
and ask them for more and they OK-ed it.’
‘So it seems like it was pretty easy to get that money.’
‘Uh-huh yeah it was. It was easy because they knew us and
they knew we had contacts in the community and we were
working with young Muslims. We have a good network in
the community and we link with the parents, especially the
mothers, and that’s important because they run the family.’
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Another Muslim youth organisation in Leeds began with
similarly humble roots. They began as a small group of friends
working with young Muslims in the local community on
volunteering initiatives as a way of dealing with issues such as
gang crime. One of the founders explains:
‘Once we got a lot of numbers [of young Muslims] on our
books the council took an interest.’
At this point they were encouraged by the local council to
apply for Prevent funding, with the support of local Prevent
ofﬁcers:
‘They wanted us to have Prevent funding because we did a
lot of the ground work, we’ve got the access and the
networks. And as part of that money they attached that
former police ofﬁcer to us, to babysit us, under the remit of
professionalising our service, because they didn’t think we
had the infrastructure set up.’
One of the issues this illustrates is that the size and reach of an
organisation’s network into a Muslim community made it
attractive for Prevent funding. In these cases, the organisations
were known to Prevent ofﬁcers in the local council, and had good
networks with the local Muslim community. Even though the
organisation in Birmingham felt their application was poor, they
still received the initial £30,000, and they then successfully
requested an additional £20,000. One way to read it would be to
suggest that for the local Prevent board, transparency and access
into an organisation with deep and broad roots into the Muslim
community, was of more importance than the amount of money
being spent or the kinds of projects that were created. What was
striking about many of the organisations, such as the two above,
that received Prevent funding, was that they did not always seem
to be obvious choices to be working on preventing extremism
related projects as their expertise lay elsewhere. However, a
common feature of many Prevent funded organisations was their
deep reach and network into their local Muslim community.
While seemingly benign, this afforded local authorities a pathway
of access into Muslim communities.
Not all Muslim organisations were comfortable working on the
Prevent agenda, and in those cases, Prevent ofﬁcers would attempt
to exploit the ﬁnancial insecurity of an organisation to exert some
pressure on it to adopt the Prevent strategy. Two Muslim youth
clubs, one in Leeds and another in Birmingham, both reported
being pressured in this way. In Birmingham, Mahmoud had been
looking for a new source of income (including from the local
council) to fund his organisation. Prevent ofﬁcers learned of his
ﬁnancial difﬁculties and would regularly contact him and
encourage him to apply for Prevent funding:
‘They were constantly pressuring me and telling me that if I
took the Prevent money I could improve the services and
prospects for the young people.’
Prevent funded Muslim organisations were targeted by a range
of state actors, such as Prevent, police, and counter-terrorism
ofﬁcers, to establish close working relations and embed ofﬁcers
with the organisation. For instance, a Prevent funded organisa-
tion in Leeds, which held regular sports events for young people,
would often see local police and Prevent ofﬁcers attend its events.
In fact, police, Prevent, and counter-terrorism ofﬁcers were often
present at a wide range of local community events, regardless of
whether they were organised with Prevent funding or related to
counter-terrorism matters. For instance, a public meeting about
some green space that had been cleaned with community
volunteers was attended by the local police, Prevent ofﬁcers,
counter-terrorism unit, probation service, and youth service.
Embedding surveillance infrastructures into Muslim
communities
The institutionalisation of relations with Muslim civil society
organisations, to deliver the Prevent agenda, served two func-
tions. On the one hand, it operationalised New Labour policy
mantras of ‘community engagement’ and ‘double devolution’ by
responsibilising Muslim communities (Taylor, 2007). On the
other hand, it served the surveillance imperative at the heart of
the Prevent strategy.
At one level, embedded surveillance is an increasingly mun-
dane feature of late modern life as it is embedded into the rou-
tines of everyday life, across private and public spaces (O’Neill
and Loftus, 2013). A key function of embedded surveillance is the
policing, control, and modiﬁcation of criminal and non-criminal
‘problematic’ behaviours and ideas. In commercial environments
surveillance is being embedded into urban regeneration projects
to police the boundaries between those that belong and those that
do not (Fussey and Coaffee, 2012). But within the context of a
‘war on terror’, embedded surveillance is tied to coercive practices
of the military, counter-terrorism units and police ofﬁcers. For
instance, Graham (2006) argues that in the military, saturating
and embedding surveillance into cities in the Global South, to
achieve constant coverage and the ability to target anyone at any
time, is at the heart of US military domination strategies.
Embedded in this way, surveillance becomes persistent, provides
a detailed map of the ground and allows surveillance infra-
structures to constantly monitor for any changes that take place
in an area, against a background of normality (Ackerman, 2002).
In a military context this kind of persistent surveillance, which is
enabled by embedded infrastructures of surveillance, is used to
provide constant support for operations. Notions of ‘Total
Information Awareness’, which emerged after 9/11, sit at the
heart of embedded surveillance practices as they attempt to build
three dimensional pictures of communities from a range of
sources that supplement each other.
Prevent ofﬁcers ‘lifestyling’ in Muslim communities. In the
arena of domestic policing, covert ofﬁcers embedding into com-
munities ﬁne tune their ability to operate in an environment and
identify changes to their normal expectations, whether that be
with people or events. Covert ofﬁcers acquire detailed knowledge
of their environments and their subjects over a prolonged period
of time, learned by processes of ‘lifestyling’, so that they are
effectively embedded and can reﬂect their environment and be
able to identify changes that are out of the ordinary (Loftus and
Goold, 2012).
In the UK’s ‘war on terror’, the Prevent strategy has been used
to create infrastructures of surveillance that connect Muslim
communities to numerous local authority organisations. Meet-
ings (both formal and informal) between Prevent funded Muslim
civil society organisations and local authorities served two
functions: ﬁrstly, to share new intelligence by sharing updates on
local Prevent projects and on local developments; secondly, to
allow Prevent and police ofﬁcers to familiarise themselves, and
become familiar, to the local Muslim community (in other
words, a form of ‘lifestyling’). In covert policing ‘lifestyling’ is
essential in order to ﬁt into an environment and to be able to
collect a good amount of quality intelligence. This means that
ofﬁcers try and craft their appearance and behaviour in ways that
correspond to the environment so as not to stand out (Loftus and
Goold, 2012).
Credibility has been a key theme of several research projects
carried out by RICU at the Home Ofﬁce. For instance, RICU
(2010) carried out research to identify the individuals and
organisations that Muslims would ﬁnd to be credible, and one
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of its ﬁndings related to the appearance and manner of people
engaging with Muslim communities. It found that to be
credible, a person should be, among other things, interested
in the Muslim community, knowledgeable, be Islamic and
strong in conviction (Sabir, 2017). In applying these ﬁndings,
Prevent ofﬁcers would often attempt to enhance their
credibility by looking (for example, by wearing a prayer hat,
traditional clothes, grow a beard, wear a hijab) and acting
Islamic (for example, symbolising their Islamic authenticity by
regularly making use of Islamic language, such as ‘Alhamdu-
lillah’, ‘Inshallah’, and other phrases such as ‘only Allah
knows’). For instance, at a Prevent funded youth project in
Leeds, I asked the supervising Prevent ofﬁcer whether they
would continue working in Prevent counter-terrorism for the
foreseeable future, to which they replied: ‘Who knows, only
Allah knows’. At another Prevent funded project in London, a
non-Muslim English Prevent ofﬁcer would greet the Pakistani
Muslims in the youth club with the Islamic greeting of peace,
As-salamu-Aleikum (peace be upon you), and use the Urdu
parting phrase, Khuda Haﬁz (May God be your Guardian). One
Friday, I came to the youth club later in the afternoon than I
had for the previous four days and the Prevent ofﬁcer asked me:
‘You’re in later than usual. Have you been to pray Juma (weekly
Friday prayer)?’
As a source of intelligence, this infrastructure can continuously
provide thick, detailed, textured, intimate information to Prevent
and police ofﬁcers on the activities, associations, behaviours,
thoughts and ideas of (mostly young) Muslims in the vicinity of a
Prevent funded project. Over the course of several years the
individuals at the heart of the Prevent surveillance infrastructure
have developed a strong familiarity with their particular local
Muslim community (its politics, key individuals, organisations
etc.) so that they can develop detailed localised analyses. A
permanent base in the heart of local Muslim communities means
surveillance and intelligence gathering is routine, unquestioned
and mundane. One of the main functions of the surveillance
infrastructure is to provide intelligence that would allow local
authorities to contain and/or steer local Muslim politics, for
example, by feeding the intelligence into related counter-
terrorism systems (such as ‘Pursue’4), where it can be used for
a range of policing activities (on the relationship between Prevent
and Pursue, see Sabir, 2017).
In the ﬁrst instance, Prevent ofﬁcers regularly attended sessions
organised by Prevent funded organisations (which started at
various times, from morning sessions at 10.00 am to evening
sessions at 8.00 pm) to establish a strong rapport and familiarity
with the management and the service users. One evening session
at a mosque in Leeds a Prevent ofﬁcer, Michael, came and joined
us in the ofﬁce (myself and three other people that ran the youth
session) as some young boys were kicking a football around
outside. He came in to collect receipts so that some expenses
could be reimbursed. After having collected the receipts however,
Michael stayed with us in the ofﬁce for the rest of the session
(over an hour) and joined in our conversations about the mosque.
That evening, a nearby (Prevent funded) youth club was not open
for the evening session and Michael wanted to know the reason.
Junaid explained that because of the cold weather and poor
heating the youth workers decided it was better to cancel the
session until the heating could be ﬁxed. How did Michael know
the other youth club was closed?
At another (Prevent funded) youth club in Leeds on another
cold, wet evening, I was sat in the ofﬁce with two of the senior
youth workers talking about football when a Prevent ofﬁcer,
Syeeda, came in and joined us. There was no apparent reason for
Syeeda’s visit, and a few minutes later she said, ‘I was just in the
area so I thought I’d drop in’. She asked Bally and Danish how the
session had been going, and if they had any trouble, speciﬁcally
referring to two young Muslims. She made them aware of a
Prevent funded residential trip she was organising for several
youth clubs and asked them to identify a few of the young people
for the trip. In particular, she asked Danish and Bally to pick
people who needed some mentoring and support. The trip would
focus on developing the kinds of skills that many Prevent projects
focused on, such as leadership skills, so that young people were
able to challenge different ‘extremist’ views. The trip would also
be attended by an Imam, who had delivered Prevent projects in
the region, and who was going to deliver talks on jihad and on the
importance Islam places on respecting elders, community leaders,
and parents. Within the context of the Prevent strategy, such talks
delivered by imams, take on a political signiﬁcance as they aim to
deliver tailored messages to young Muslims. Syeeda asked Danish
to approach the parents to get consent for the trip, despite the fact
that she was organising the trip. For the parents, a known local
Muslim face, as opposed to that of a Prevent ofﬁcer, would make
them more comfortable in agreeing to allow their children to
attend the trip.
When she left an hour later, Bally and Danish turned to me
and said,
‘She does that all the time. She wasn’t here to make small
talk, on one of the coldest nights of the year. She came in to
check whether we were open. It’s her way of keeping an ear
to the ground’.
As well as informal meetings such as this, Prevent funded
organisations also held regular formal weekly and monthly
meetings with a range of local authorities such as police, Prevent,
and counter-terrorism ofﬁcers. In Birmingham, Aleesha said
these meetings were an obligation and they were arranged to
feedback any new developments since the previous meeting.
Many of the meetings were attended by individuals from several
Prevent funded organisations in the local area and were useful for
the ofﬁcers to network with and develop a stronger familiarity.
The aim of that was, according to Aleesha, to become comfortable
with the ofﬁcers so that they would feel comfortable sharing
information.
For the young people in the youth clubs, the constant presence
of local authorities was uncomfortable. At a Prevent funded youth
club in Leeds, one of the boys complains to me: ‘Why is he
[Danish] always letting the ‘maaveh’ (police) in here?’ Danish was
very clear about the reasons behind their presence:
‘I told them that’s the price of opening a youth club. We
wouldn’t have been allowed to open otherwise. When they
see that we engage with the police they say to us, ‘are you
off your rocker?!’ Obviously they don’t like that and don’t
want to be near the police because they’re paranoid based
on past experiences.’
Embedding into local Muslim organisations in this way is
aimed at fostering a culture of surveillance. At a local council
Prevent workshop in London, organised by Prevent ofﬁcer John,
and attended by Prevent ofﬁcers, police ofﬁcers, counter-
terrorism ofﬁcers and youth workers, an outside ‘terrorism
expert’ was invited to deliver a talk on radicalisation. He advised
the group that they had an important role to play in preventing
radicalisation, and that they could identify radicalisation, by
looking for changes in young people in the following four areas:
language, behaviour, peers and needs. If anyone noticed any
changes in these areas, then they needed to raise the issue. This
kind of mentoring is a necessary precursor, to mould people
working in voluntary and statutory organisations, into vigilant
actors capable of collecting and feeding intelligence into Prevent
channels of communication.
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Intelligence gathering in Muslim communities. Primarily, sur-
veillance of Muslim communities in the Prevent strategy is
facilitated by Prevent ofﬁcers that manage several Prevent funded
projects in a local area. However, this is supplemented by local
police ofﬁcers and counter-terrorism ofﬁcers. Several examples
illustrate this.
Firstly, at the Prevent funded mosque in Leeds, I attended the
youth sessions with Junaid, who was one of the committee
members that ran the sessions. Some of the young people were
playing football, others were playing together on an Xbox, and
others were playing table tennis. I asked Junaid what had changed
in the services they offered young people since they began
receiving Prevent funding:
‘Not much has changed for us. But obviously they [Prevent
ofﬁcers] want get in to the mosques and see who’s using the
services and if there’s any dodgy characters that we need to
pass onto them’.
At another Prevent funded youth club in Leeds, manager
Haroon told me at one of the sessions that he had a meeting with
local Prevent and police ofﬁcers earlier in that week. When I
asked him what they discussed, he told me:
‘They’re always pushing to do more partnership work
because they get more access to us that way. They’re always
asking about the youngsters, what they’re doing, what their
views are, who they hang out with, and where they hang
out’.
‘Do they ask you about the youngsters in their meetings
with you?’
‘Yes of course, they ask us all the time. They want to know
how many youths we have, how old they are, where they go
after madrassa [evening class], how much time do they
spend at these places, what do we teach them at madrassa.
How can they expect us to know all this information? They
still pester us about it all the time. They still ask us to keep
an eye on the people that use the mosque for them’.
In line with other instances of direct community engagement
in a range of social policy areas (Taylor, 2007), community
participation in Prevent counter-terrorism is at times charac-
terised by an internalisation of the rationale of Prevent (to protect
funding), and at other times marked by tensions over competing
agendas. Counter-terrorism governance spaces are inscribed with
the rationale of surveillance, which sits at the heart of the Prevent
strategy, and it meant that some organisations did not achieve
their aims and goals. The constant demands for information from
community organisations and the overt surveillance character to
engagements with Prevent ofﬁcers meant that, in some cases,
relations broke down. For example, a youth club in London
managed by Shaf, submitted an application for Prevent funding
and used the money to create a leadership project to enhance
leadership skills in the young Muslims that used the youth club.
The project was a collaborative effort between the youth club, the
local Prevent ofﬁcers, the Metropolitan Police Service, and the
local council. Shaf felt that the young Muslims needed role
models and conﬁdence in their ability to do what they wanted, go
out in the world and be able to compete for the leading jobs
across all sectors, and he felt leadership skills were a key
component in building conﬁdence. Now that the project had
ended Shaf was very critical of the Prevent strategy. For him,
Prevent was very much like a surveillance operation, in that, in
some cases it was run by Prevent ofﬁcers who were former police
ofﬁcers with an intelligence background or in close collaboration
with them:
‘This made it difﬁcult to work together on the project
because they all wanted to run the project more like a
surveillance operation’.
Shaf had some very frank discussions with the Prevent and
police ofﬁcers after several requests to share information about
the local Muslims: who used the youth club and the mosque, who
distributed leaﬂets outside the mosque, what kinds of discussions
did the youngsters have at the youth club, who did they associate
within the community and so on. Shaf was clear he was not
prepared to collect and share any intelligence. Despite protests
from police and Prevent ofﬁcers, he was adamant that the project
would not be used as an intelligence gathering operation in the
local Muslim community. This was the major stumbling block
between them which strained the relationship.
Secondly, there were instances in which local counter-terrorism
ofﬁcers worked with Prevent ofﬁcers. In Birmingham, youth club
manager Musa was trying to identify new sources of income and
was approached by a local Prevent ofﬁcer with a view to applying
for Prevent funding. The Prevent ofﬁcer also involved local police
and counter-terrorism ofﬁcers with the youth club. One ofﬁcer in
particular, from the local counter-terrorism unit, was keen to
recruit Musa as a ‘trusted contact’ so that they could work
together for the beneﬁt of the local Muslim community.
At the start of one of the youth sessions as everyone ran to start
playing games, Musa came over to me and told me wanted to
speak with me. He asked ‘Can we go into the ofﬁce because it’s
quite sensitive and I don’t want to talk in front of all these people’.
We went into the ofﬁce and Musa took out a business card and
handed it to me and said that this CTU ofﬁcer had attended on
several occasions to talk with him. The ofﬁcer was keen to engage
with Musa, and through him, with the wider Somali Muslim
community. Musa complained that the ofﬁcer always wanted to
arrange another meeting and to speak with the young people that
attended the sessions. He showed me some of the emails that he
received, each beginning with ‘As-salamu-Aleikum!’ He was keen
to learn about the Somali community and Somali culture and
hoped Musa would give him some key insights. In another email,
he asked Musa about some rumours he had heard about Somali
parents conﬁscating their children’s passports to prevent them
from travelling to Somalia and joining Al-Shabaab. Was there any
truth to these rumours? Are Somalis from Birmingham going to
Somalia to ﬁght? Musa felt that the ofﬁcer wanted to know which
parents had conﬁscated passports so that their children could be
targeted by counter-terrorism ofﬁcers. At one of the meetings
Musa asked the CTU ofﬁcer why he was keen to engage with him:
was there evidence of terrorist activity in the community? The
ofﬁcer explained his model of radicalisation, which was steeped in
Islamophobia, and clearly regurgitated from the Prevent policy
document: this community has a high Muslim presence with a lot
of young Muslims hanging out on street corners, which made
them vulnerable to radicalisation by expert recruiters.
Musa felt that he was being groomed as a spy or contact in the
Somali community for the ofﬁcer, because he will have learned
from the Prevent ofﬁcer and through his own attendance at the
youth sessions, that Musa’s organisation had a good network in
the Somali Muslim community. However, Musa did not want to
engage with him and decided to ignore him:
‘The pressure is immense. They want to be my friend so
they can get access, they want me to collect personal
information by spying for them. What can I do? I want to
tell him to fuck off and leave me alone. But they can arrest
me very easily’.
Given that Musa had arrived in the country from Somalia and
was being targeted for information by a counter-terrorism ofﬁcer
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who had powers of arrest, the emails were read as demands. The
wider context of the ‘war on terror’ which produced regular news
stories of high-proﬁle arrests by counter-terrorism ofﬁcers fuelled
Musa’s fears of being arrested. Despite this, Musa’s relationship
with the local Prevent ofﬁcer fell apart because of these demands
because he was not prepared to act as a spy. As a result, he did not
apply for any Prevent funds.
These fears of surveillance permeated right across Muslim
communities. In Birmingham, at the completion of a Prevent
funded project at Aleesha’s youth organisation, a presentation
ceremony was arranged at which the young people received
certiﬁcates. Among other people, the ceremony was attended by
the local Prevent, police and counter-terrorism ofﬁcers, which
made Aleesha uncomfortable:
‘But at that graduation I didn’t want them anywhere near
my kids to be frankly honest’.
‘Who didn’t you want near your kids?’
‘Any of the Prevent people’.
‘Why?
‘Because they’re all counter terrorism hawks and it’s not
good for my kids to be near them. I didn’t want them
speaking to my kids either. The information they enquired
about, we gave them, but I didn’t want them speaking to my
kids’.
Thirdly, there were also some indications that local police
ofﬁcers had adopted the Prevent strategy in their engagement
with Muslim communities. At a youth club in Birmingham I
asked one of the youth workers about their engagement with the
local police:
‘The police come every two days, if not everyday, to check
up on the people in the centre, which feels like they’re
spying. The police look at who is entering and using the
youth centre. Some of us wear traditional clothes and they
probably think we’re radicalising the younger lads. When a
regular face isn’t present they ask us where he is’.
The affects of Prevent surveillance
The embedded surveillance of the Prevent strategy has produced
strong cultures of suspicion and fear in Muslim communities.
The presence and awareness of surveillance almost automatically
produces a range of feelings and unconscious wordless states
which induce particular emotional responses in certain spaces
(Ellis et al., 2013). Surveillance therefore has signiﬁcant affective
consequences. For Muslims, in many cases surveillance is an
everyday experience and is almost always experienced as
oppressive and produces fear and apprehension as it monitors
and records their performance of ‘Britishness’. Given the all-
encompassing nature of the ‘war on terror’, these emotional
reactions have become an ordinary part of everyday life for
Muslims: at school; whilst socialising and shopping; on public
transport; at work; at mosques and so on. As such, surveillance
impacts the way in which power and social relations are experi-
enced and understood (Koskela, 2000).
These implications of surveillance were manifest during all
stages of ﬁeldwork. Whether it was parents changing the youth
club their child attended after learning it received Prevent fund-
ing, or young Muslims feeling unable to openly and freely discuss
the politics of the ‘war on terror’, or express their religiosity and
culture (by, for example, growing a beard, wearing a hijab, or
wearing traditional clothes), there were underlying tensions. At a
focus group in Leeds, a young Muslim articulates his
apprehensions:
‘I’ll tell you how I see it. I see Muslims…as tongue tied.
They have to be careful what they say so as to not say
something out of line because anything you say today can
be classed as “extremism”. Because of that I think Muslims
are restricted. We’re under extreme stress, restricted. Our
identity is being challenged; we’re under the microscope a
lot more. And the way we’re deﬁned keeps us under the
microscope. We haven’t got freedom of speech’.
Surveillance as part of the Prevent strategy plays a signiﬁcant
role in this apprehension because it is the most regular contact
point between Muslims and the state on security matters. As a
researcher working in this environment, the research process was
constantly touched by it. There were two initial concerns that
people had with my presence. First, was I a spy? The sheer
number of Muslims interrogated at ports, in custody, and at
home (HM Government, 2017) and encouraged to work, either
for the police or a spy agency, as well as high-proﬁle cases of spies
posing as ‘researchers’ (Bano, 2011), meant that people were
generally apprehensive about my presence. One person in Lon-
don would cross the road every time he saw me walking in his
direction. Second, once I had convinced a person I was not
working as a spy, I was asked about the source of my research
funding. At a youth club in London I initially introduced myself
to a youth worker and talked about my research. The following
day at the youth club, his brother was also present. Qasim was in
the middle of a PhD, and so, was familiar enough with research
funding processes and research proposals at university to inter-
rogate me. Who was funding the research? Was it a research
council or a university scholarship? What were my research
questions? What methodology was I using? What was my
hypothesis? Had I reached any conclusions? I came to expect
Fig. 2 ‘Met Box’ at a mosque in London. This ﬁgure is covered by the
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
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these kinds of questions as a natural consequence of the fears of
surveillance in Muslim communities. ‘You understand why we
ask you, right?’ was how Qasim put it.
Directing and containing Islamic politics
In this article I have demonstrated that from the Prevent strategy
an infrastructure of surveillance has been created and embedded
into Muslim communities. Prevent, police, and counter-terrorism
ofﬁcers are the key protagonists in the infrastructure as they seek
out individuals and organisations to work with in Muslim com-
munities and gain access to their networks. Although some of
their conduct may seem innocent, the surveillance imperative at
the heart of the Prevent strategy undermines assertions of
innocence.
The intelligence gathered from this embedded infrastructure of
surveillance, and its affective consequences, are at the heart of
attempts to direct and contain Muslim politics and Islamic
identities. Junaid gave me two examples of Prevent ofﬁcers
inﬂuencing the mosque. First, Hizb-ut-Tahrir (an Islamic political
party) used to leaﬂet outside the mosque after Juma prayers but
the committee banned them from leaﬂetting. The local Prevent
and police ofﬁcers had raised the issue with the mosque com-
mittee, and because the committee did not want to jeopardise any
funding, they agreed to ban the organisation from leaﬂetting.
Secondly, I asked Junaid how the Prevent funding had changed
the service they offered the young people, and he informed me
that for the most part, it remained the same. What had changed
was that:
‘We give them some more Islamic education and leadership
skills so that if they come across a “radical” then they can
identify them and challenge them, or let someone else know
about it who can go in and deal with that person. We also
use this programme to dialogue with teachers, parents and
the authorities to work for the kids’.
In short, what had changed was that the Islamic identity of
young Muslims at the mosque was being moulded, with tailored
Islamic education classes and leadership workshops, in the
interests of the state. The young Muslims were being equipped
with a particular version of Islam and the leadership skills to
promote it.
At other mosques in London, the Metropolitan Police Service
installed a ‘Met Box’ with a pen attached, to allow mosque goers
the opportunity to communicate with the police anonymously
(Fig. 2).
Some of the Prevent funded organisations extended their reach
beyond their immediate environment and their usual audience. In
Leeds, Junaid and the mosque committee, used some of the
Prevent funds to create mentoring projects in two local Leeds
schools. They worked with the school to identify Muslim ‘kids
that are trouble causers and badly behaved’ for individual men-
toring. In London, Aleem’s 15-year-old son was targeted for this
kind of intervention by a Prevent funded organisation. Aleem
said:
‘They [school] picked kids who they thought were badly
behaved. Apparently that made them vulnerable to
extremism. They did some mentoring sessions and told
the kids not to get involved in extremism’.
These examples illustrate some of the ways in which the Pre-
vent surveillance infrastructure is used to contain and direct
Muslim politics. It simultaneously operates on a general and
particular level: it targets whole Muslim communities to identify
potential ‘extremists’ and potentially risky individuals to be
moulded into appropriate British citizens, whilst also seeking to
identify those that that need to be marked for exclusion and
passed onto the Pursue strategy. Channelling individuals marked
as ‘(potential) extremists’ into deradicalisation projects is an
attempt to neutralise risks to the political status quo by
remoulding identities and politics with reference to ‘British
values’. In doing this, the state is engaged in attempts to socially
engineer Muslim politics and political agency vis-à-vis its own
politics by drawing boundaries around and deﬁning ‘good/bad’
Muslim/Islam. In the ﬁrst of Junaid’s examples above, Hizb-ut-
Tahrir was banned from leaﬂetting at the mosque because it falls
outside the conﬁnes of acceptable Muslim Islamic politics. Ban-
ning the organisation sends a coercive signal to ‘extremists’
(about the unacceptable nature of their Islamic identity and
politics) and ‘moderates’ (about the importance of staying within
the conﬁnes of acceptability and keeping away from political
positions from beyond the border lest they are subject to the same
exclusionary practices). The cultures of suspicion and fear pro-
duced by this practice of surveillance in Muslim communities
exercises signiﬁcant inﬂuence on political agency. Intelligence
gathering from surveillance practices is often the basis for high
proﬁle counter-terror raids and arrests which exerts further
coercive pressures on Muslims as they are all potential targets.
As with the Home Ofﬁce denials about allegations of spying in
the Prevent agenda, Prevent ofﬁcers that I interviewed rejected
claims about Prevent surveillance in Muslim communities. These
denials ranged from being outright (‘that’s bollocks’), to some
acknowledgement of sinister behaviour by Prevent and police
ofﬁcers. Asked about the increasingly close ties between Prevent
and police ofﬁcers and Muslim civil society organisations, one
Prevent ofﬁcer responds:
‘[Long silence, looking at the ﬂoor]. Hmm, good question.
[Long silence]. There’s no doubt that that started off as part
of the government agenda around making links with
Muslims, and they were I think, an easy place to come
across the Muslim community, particularly the mosque. So
we do have these meetings, but we see the mosques as the
gateway into the community, rather than it being anything
sinister. I think there is an element that does behave like
this based on stereotypes, but the majority do it because
they genuinely want to get to know the community. So if we
say 70% is genuine because it’s about community engage-
ment, and about 30% is about wanting to see what’s going
on and is a bit more sinister’.
Conclusion: Prevent and the normalisation of Islamophobia
This article has sought to uncover and analyse the function of
surveillance at the heart of the Prevent strategy. The article shows
how the framing of the terror threat in the ‘war on terror’ has
afforded a surveillance infrastructure, embedded into Muslim
communities, which has securitised relations with local autho-
rities. Its intelligence products, as well as the affective con-
sequences of surveillance, have served to contain and direct
Muslim political agency. Using empirical data, the article
uncovers the Islamophobic function of counter-terrorism sur-
veillance in the Prevent strategy.
The surveillance of the Prevent strategy is Islamophobic sur-
veillance because it is informed by the framing of the terror threat
as an Islamic threat, which casts all Muslims as potential terrorists
that need to be monitored and categorised. The location, lan-
guage, values, and image of terrorists, and the terror threat, are
thus predominantly gauged against a standard notion of nor-
mality, the vantage point from which surveillance and counter-
terrorism is directed, which is racialized and which results in an
uneven surveillance gaze (Fiske, 1998). Focussing on Muslims,
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Prevent surveillance operates to identify and categorise Muslims
on the basis of a dichotomy that is infused with Islamophobic
tropes, into ‘good’ safe ‘moderate’ Muslims and ‘bad’ dangerous
‘extremist’ Muslims, and is used to police and reinforce this
boundary (Mamdani, 2005). These decisions are made on the
basis of political positions vis-à-vis the state, the ‘war on terror’,
the language and framework that Muslims chose to use to
articulate their political activism and ideas, and how they look
and dress. In other words, the Islamophobic surveillance of the
Prevent strategy aims to regulate the conduct of Muslims as
British citizens with ‘British values’ by demonising everything else
(Fiske, 1998). Those that are deemed to be ‘bad’ Muslims and are
not authentically performing Britishness, in the ﬁrst instance,
need to be moulded into good British Muslim citizens (using ‘de-
radicalisation’ programmes, for instance), and their inclusion
needs to be monitored. If this fails, and the Prevent strategy is
unable to effect containment, then they are passed from Prevent
to other parts of the counter-terrorism structure (such as Pursue)
for the purposes of exclusion and neutralisation. As such, the
Prevent strategy is an instance and a continuation of the historical
strategies of containment targeting ‘Others’. The Prevent infra-
structure of surveillance is built using local community actors and
organisations, and it is used to monitor the politics of Muslims
and socially engineer those with risky unacceptable politics.
Consider, for example, Prevent interventions in the public sector,
buttressed by demonising and fear inducing discourses of
‘entryism’, for making claims for equality in the provision of
prayer space, dress code and taking pro-Palestinian political
positions (Rights Watch, 2016; Prevent Watch, 2016; Bouattia,
2015). The embedded nature of Prevent surveillance in Muslim
communities, which provides a constant, textured, intimate
image, allows for a more efﬁcient monitoring of change against a
background of normality learned over a prolonged period of time,
and thus a more efﬁcient containment of undesirable politics.
The operation of the Prevent strategy illustrates the way in
which a logic of Islamophobia sits at the heart of the ‘war on
terror’, characterises its main tendencies, and is normalised by an
ever growing ‘war on terror’. In particular, Islamophobia is nor-
malised in the ‘war on terror’ as it is transposed into the more
acceptable language of security. Beratan (2008, p 337) uses the
concept of transposition to explain ‘a history in which all victories
or progress have been almost immediately undermined through
systemic mechanisms that serve to maintain existing dis-
crimination’. The threat of terrorism allows the state to contain
Muslim political agency, by characterising that which is unde-
sirable as a threat, to be dealt with by the apparatus of social
control. Hall and Scraton (1981, p 408) argue, ‘[the criminal label]
can sometimes be applied to activities which the authorities
oppose, not because they are “criminal” but because they are
politically threatening. In such circumstances, “criminalisation”
can provide the justiﬁcation for political containment. “Crim-
inalisation” is a particularly powerful weapon, when used in this
way, because it mobilizes considerable popular approval and
legitimacy behind the state. People are more likely to support
state action against a “criminal” act than they would the use of the
law to repress a “political” cause.’ Techniques of transposition
hide and mask the Islamophobic character of surveillance in the
Prevent strategy, and in doing so, normalise and mainstream
notions of Islamic threat and Muslim barbarity. By transposing
the goal of ‘containing Muslim political agency’ into the key of
‘security against terrorism’, the Prevent strategy is able to practice
Islamophobia, because the acceptability of trading liberties for
security allows claims against the Prevent strategy to be dismissed
as necessary in the ﬁght against terrorism.
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Notes
1 Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 allows the police to stop and search people at
UK ports without any ‘reasonable suspicion’ of involvement in terrorism. The police
can search and seize any items, download and store data from electronic devices, take
ﬁngerprints and a DNA sample, and compel a person to answer questions without
access to a lawyer (failure to do so is a criminal offence).
2 The Channel programme is connected to the Prevent strategy and provides a
mechanism for referring ‘radicalised’ individuals or those considered vulnerable to
‘radicalisation’ (HM Government, 2010).
3 The Channel Vulnerability Assessment Framework identiﬁes 22 factors of
radicalisation (HM Government, 2012).
4 ‘Pursue’ is one part of the CONTEST strategy and aims to prevent terrorist attacks by
using detection, prosecution, and disruption tactics (HM Government, 2011b).
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